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NOTES
BALANCING ACT: PUBLIC POLICY AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES CAPS
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 8, 1997, a federal court jury in Charleston, South Carolina,
awarded $262.5 million in damages to the parents of a six-year-old boy who died
when the rear latch on a Chrysler minivan failed in a crash, causing the child to be
thrown from the vehicle.' The award consisted of $12.5 million in actual damages
and $250 million in punitive damages.2 It was the largest verdict ever returned
against an automobile manufacturer,3 and may also be the largest verdict in South
Carolina's history.4 The verdict comes at a time when a bill that would cap punitive
damages at the greater of $250,000 or three times actual damages is stalled in the
South Carolina House of Representatives.'
For supporters of the bill, the Charleston verdict is a dream come true,
demonstrating that punitive damages really are out of control. A spokesman for
Chrysler called the verdict "outrageously large."6 Opponents respond that it is
Chrysler's conductthat is outrageous. At leastthirty-seven people have already died
due to the defective rear latches on Chrysler minivans! Rather than recalling the
minivans, Chrysler instituted a "service campaign" to replace the defective latches.8
Yet, in the first fifteen months of the campaign, Chrysler replaced less than half of
the defective latches?
And so the debate rages on. This Note analyzes the punitive damages bill now
pending in the South Carolina General Assembly. Part II gives a brief overview of
the history of punitive damages in South Carolina and compares the bill to current
law. Part III discusses the policies behind imposing punitive damages and some of
the arguments that have been used to challenge their propriety, and then summarizes
1. Verdict in S.C. Boy's Death Shocks Chrysler, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 9, 1997, at
Al. The plaintiffs contended that the child was thrown from the rear hatch; Chrysler contended that
the unrestrained child was thrown through a side window. Id.
2. Id. "The punitive damage verdict accounts for just over 2% of the profits Chrysler Corpora-
tion made on the minivan.... Chrysler made almost $250,000,000 in profits just during the five
weeks that we tried this case." Letter from Mark C. Joye, attorney for the plaintiffs (Dec. 18, 1997)
(on file with author).
3. THE STATE, supra note 1.
4. Id. (citing Columbia, South Carolina, attorney David Fedor).
5. H.R. 3019, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997).
6. THE STATE, supra note I (quoting Mike Aberlich).




Hawkins: Balancing Act: Public Policy and Punitive Damages Caps
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the empirical data on the size and frequency of such verdicts. Part IV discusses the
effects of tort reform legislation and argues that the General Assembly should not
enact the bill.
II. BACKGROUND
Punitive damages have been around for a long time.'" In 1784, South Carolina
became one of the first American states to recognize punitive damages. In the
seminal case of Genay v. Norris," the defendant, a physician, put poison into
another man's wine glass as a joke, causing the man to become seriously ill. The
defendant called it a "drunken frolic," but the court called it an "outrage" and ruled
that the plaintiff was entitled to exemplary damages." This case is particularly
noteworthy for two reasons. First, the defendant's actions fell somewhere between
negligent and intentional conduct-the court described it as "wanton."' 3 Second, the
court held, not thatthe defendant deserved to pay exemplary damages (although that
was certainly implicit), but more precisely that the plaintiffwas "entitled" to them. 4
Any discussion of the policies behind punitive damages in South Carolina must take
these two points into consideration.
In the two centuries since Genay, the law of punitive damages in this state has
been refimed, but the underlying principles remain unchanged. Punitive damages are
"warranted only when the defendant's conduct is shown to be willful, wanton, or
in reckless disregard of the rights of others"' 5 and will not be awarded for mere
negligence, "whether simple or 'gross.""..6 The test is whether the act was
"'committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary
reason or prudence would then have been conscious of it as an invasion of the
plaintiff s rights.""..7 Thus, South Carolina explicitly prohibits the imposition of
punitive damages in cases of strict liability.'" Moreover, in order to award punitive
10. As long as four thousand years ago, the Code of Hammurabi, the earliest known legal code,
provided for punitive damages. In England, statutes calling for multiple damages appeared as early as
1275. See generally David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Re-
form 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 368 (1994) [hereinafter Overview](giving the history of punitive dam-
ages).
11. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784).
12. Id. Although the court referred to the damages as "exemplary," a commentator in a headnote
to the case referred to the remedy as "vindictive damages." Id. at 6.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Love Chevrolet, Inc., 324 S.C. 149, 478
S.E.2d 57, 58 (1996).
16. F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 582 (2d
ed. 1997).
17. Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 199, 125 S.E.2d 408, 413-14 (1962) (quoting Rogers v.
Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 577, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1958)).
18. Barnwell v. Barber-Colman Co., 301 S.C. 534, 393 S.E.2d 162 (1989).
[Vol. 49:293
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damages, the jury must first find actual damages, 9 although nominal damages are
sufficient.2"
Punitive damages are awarded "'in the interest of society in the nature of
punishment and as a warning and example to deter the wrongdoer and others from
committing like offenses in the future.",'21 Because Genay is still good law in this
state,' punitive damages are also awarded "as vindication of[a] private right."' For
this reason, plaintiffs in South Carolina are "entitled" to punitive damages when
they prove a "wanton, willful, or malicious violation of [their] rights., 24 When the
defendant's conduct meets this test, the jury must award punitive damages.25
Several new developments in the law of punitive damages have taken place in
this state in recent years. Most notably, in Gamble v. Stevenson26 the Supreme Court
of South Carolina held that trial judges must conduct post-trial reviews of all
punitive damage awards.27 The court established eight factors that a trial court may
consider in its review:
(1) defendant's degree of culpability; (2) duration of the conduct; (3)
defendant's awareness or concealment; (4) the existence of similar past
conduct; (5) likelihood the award will deter the defendant or others from
like conduct; (6) whether the award is reasonably related to the harm likely
19. Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 111, 406 S.E,2d 350, 354 (1991).
20. Cook v. Atlantic CoastLine R.R., 183 S.C. 279, 283, 190 S.E. 923, 925 (1937); Save
Charleston Found. v. Murray, 286 S.C. 170, 178, 333 S.E.2d 60, 65 (Ct. App. 1985) (permitting puni-
tive damages based on nominal damages only when it is clearly shown that a legal right has been will-
fully or recklessly invaded and that nominal actual damages were merged in the verdict for punitive
damages).
21. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 110, 406 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243
S.C. 388, 396, 134 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1964)).
22. See, e.g., South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Love Chevrolet, Inc., 324
S.C. 149, 151, 478 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1996) (citing Genay for the longstanding availability of punitive
damages in South Carolina); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567,573, 106 S.E.2d 258,261
(1958) (same).
23. Davenport v. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 225 S.C. 52, 60, 80 S.E.2d 740, 743 (1954).
24. Id., 80 S.E.2d at 744.
25. Id. ("[W]hen under proper allegations a plaintiff proves a wilful, wanton, reckless, or mali-
cious violation of his rights, it is not only the right but the duty of the jury to award punitive dam-
ages."); see also Gilbert v. Duke Power Co., 255 S.C. 495, 500, 179 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1971) (stating
that plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages upon proof of the requisite culpability); HUBBARD &
FELIX, supra note 16, at 582-83 (same).
26. 305 S.C. 104, 406 S.E.2d 350 (1991). The post-trial review established in Gamble was in-
stituted in response to Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), to ensure that punitive
damages awarded in South Carolina could withstand due process challenges. However, appellate re-
view is limited to the abuse of discretion standard. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 112, 406 S.E.2d at 355; see
also Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S.C. 189, 200, 125 S.E.2d 408, 414 (1962) ("[I]t is well settled that
the granting of a new trial on the ground that the verdict is so excessive as to indicate caprice, passion
or prejudice on the part of the jury is in the discretion of the trial judge and his decision thereon will
not be disturbed unless abuse of discretion is shown.").
27. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 111, 406 S.E.2d at 354.
19981
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to result from such conduct; (7) defendant's ability to pay; and finally
(8)... "other factors" deemed appropriate."
While Gamble did not expressly require that these factors be charged to the jury,
later cases have indicated the propriety of such a charge.29 Additionally, in 1988 the
South Carolina General Assembly raised the standard of proof in punitive damages
cases. A plaintiff must now prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the
defendant's conduct was reckless or wanton.3"
If enacted, House Bill 3019 would dramatically change the law of this state.
The bill begins as a codification of much of the basic common-law principles
governing punitive damages: "Punitive damages may be awarded in a civil action,
subject to the provisions of this chapter, to punish a defendant for wilful, wanton,
or reckless conduct and to deter the defendant and others from committing similar
wrongful acts."' The bill defines "wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct" as "the
conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of
others, which the defendant knows or should know are reasonably likely to result
in injury, damage, or other harm."3 The conduct must constitute "more than gross
negligence."33
At first blush, nothing in these initial provisions appears to change the common
law standard of conduct necessary to impose punitive damages. But even this initial
paragraph changes current law in two major respects. First, the objectives of
punitive damages are limited to punishment and deterrence. The bill does not
recognize vindication of a private right as a valid reason to impose punitive
damages. Second, the bill provides that punitive damages "may" be awarded.34
Under this bill, punitive damages would no longer be a right to which the plaintiff
is entitled when the defendant's conduct meets the requisite degree of culpability.
The bill would make numerous additional substantive and procedural changes
in South Carolina law, including abolition of punitive damages for vicarious
liability, trial bifurcation, and shifting of attorneys' fees for malicious or frivolous
claims or defenses involving punitive damages." In addition, the bill codifies the
Gamble factors forjury consideration, with some minor changes. Most notably, the
bill eliminates the discretionary "other factors deemed appropriate."36 However, the
28. Id. at 111-12, 406 S.E.2d at 354.
29. See, e.g., Miller v. City of West Columbia, 322 S.C. 224, 232,471 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1996)
("After careful review of the record, we conclude that not only did the trial judge appropriately charge
the jury with the Gamble factors, but he also reviewed these factors during the post[-]trial motions
hearing to ensure that the punitive damage award was appropriate and necessary.").
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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most ambitious change contained in the bill, and the focus of this Note, is a cap on
punitive damages at the greater of three times the amount of compensatory damages
or $250,000."7
III. THE DEBATE: POLICY RATIONALES, CRITICISMS, AND EMPIRICAL DATA
Public policy justifies imposing punitive damages. The most commonly cited
reasons for punitive damages are punishment of the defendant and deterrence of the
defendant and others from similar misbehavior.38 Although these are the only
justifications for punitive damages included in the pending bill,39 other theories
supporting punitive damages include preserving the peace (i.e. preventing injured
parties from taking the law into their own hands); providing an incentive for private
civil law enforcement, sometimes referred to as encouraging private attorneys
general; and compensating victims for otherwise noncompensable losses, such as
attorneys' fees.4" As discussed above, South Carolina puts its own spin on the issue
and allows punitive damages as a vindication of a private right.4' Despite being
well-established, punitive damages have been the subject of furious debate.
Punitive damages have been criticized as a windfall to the plaintiff.42 At least in
South Carolina, this is not necessarily true. Professor David G. Owen suggests that
a moral principle underlying punitive damages is an individual's right not to be
violated by a tortfeasor.43 In that sense at least, punitive damages are compensatory
because they compensate plaintiffs for the freedom that was "stolen" from them."
This theory has long underpinned the law in South Carolina, as evidenced by Genay
and subsequent cases.45 The policy of awarding punitive damages as vindication of
37. H.R. 3019, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997). The bill provides for only one ex-
ception: the cap does not apply if the defendant's actions would subject him to prosecution for driv-
ing under the influence.
38. See Overview, supra note 10, at 373 ("Although most courts refer only to 'punishment' and
'deterrence' as rationales for such damages, this masks the variety of specific functions that punitive
damages actually serve.") (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 908(1) (1977)).
39. H.R. 3019, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997).
40. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1982).
41. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
42. This criticism is often used to justify reform statutes calling for remission to the state of a
portion of all punitive damage awards. See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Dam-
ages Statutes: A Proposed Alternative, 20 J. LEGIs. 191, 196 (1994). However, this concern is at
least partially addressed by recent federal legislation making punitive damages subject to income tax.
I.R.C. § 104 (West Supp. 1996).
43. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 705, 708-
13 (1989).
44. Id.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14; see also Hughey v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470,481,
154 S.E.2d 839, 844 (1967) (Bussey, J., dissenting) ("The rendition of punitive damages under such
circumstances is part of the established public policy of this state and such damages involve a com-
1998]
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a private right is also consistent with deterring injured parties from taking the law
into their own hands, while still making restitution for the personal violation that
has occurred.
Tort reform proponents also criticize the vague guidelines for imposing
punitives damages and the social and economic harm caused by "overdeterrence."
Critics assert that punitive damages are harmful to the economy. Fear of punitive
damages may inhibit innovation in the development of new and potentially useful
products and may keep useful products off the market entirely. Punitive damages
may impair American competitiveness in the world market by increasing the cost
of manufacturing and selling products.46
In addition to policy criticisms, punitive damages have faced constitutional
challenges on several grounds. One theory is that punitive damages are quasi-
criminal punishment, yet defendants are not afforded the procedural due process
protections that criminal defendants enjoy.47 Another theory is that repetitive
punitive damages may violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive
fines.48 This latter argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.49 However, the
Court's decision was rooted in the assumption that the state did not share in the
recovery."0 Therefore, this argument is sure to resurface in jurisdictions enacting
reform measures requiring a portion of punitive awards to be paid to the state."'
One constitutional attack finally succeeded in the Supreme Court. In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court indicated that excessive punitive damages may
constitute a violation of defendants' substantive due process rights, and indeed,
invited such a challenge. 2 In Haslip, the Court stated: "[W]e cannot say that the
pensatory aspect."); Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429,437, 144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (1965) ("[S]uch dam-
ages involve a compensatory aspect which we have long recognized."); Watts v. South Bound R.R.,
60 S.C. 67,73, 38 S.E. 240,242 (1901) ("[S]uch damages in a measure compensate or satisfy for the
wilfulness with which the private right was invaded .... ).
46. See 138 CONG. REc. S13149 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1992) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). See
generally Philip Shuchman, It Isn't that the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It's Just that the Tort Re-
formers Are So Wrong, 49 RtrGERsL.REV. 485, 486-87 (1997) (listing "claimed bad effects" of the
American tort system).
47. See, e.g., Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983) (arguing that civil defendants subject to punitive damages
claims should have many of the same procedural protections provided to criminal defendants).
48. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REv. 139, 140 (1986).
49. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
50. See id. at 264 ('[The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment] does not constrain
an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor
has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.").
51. See Overview, supra note 10, at 401. In any event, the federal government has already found
a way of getting its share of punitive awards. Punitive damages are now subject to income tax. I.R.C.
§ 104 (West Supp. 1996).
52. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-
77 (issue not preserved); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76 (1988) (declined to
[Vol. 49:293
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common-law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to
deny due process and be per se unconstitutional." 3 Yet, "[i]t would be just as
inappropriate to say that, because punitive damages have been recognized for so
long, their imposition is never unconstitutional. '5 4 Until 1996, the Court never
found any award excessive, not even a punitive damages award that was 526 times
the plaintiff's actual damages."5
In 1996, the Court for the first time in history reversed a punitive damages
award in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.6 Dr. Ira Gore purchased a new
$40,000 BMW that he later discovered had been damaged and then repainted prior
to sale. Gore sued the manufacturer for fraud, and the jury awarded him $4000 in
actual damages (the reduced value of the car) and $4 million in punitive damages."8
The Supreme Court of Alabama cut the punitive damages award in half,9 but the
United States Supreme Court found even $2 million "grossly excessive,"6 and
remanded the case for determination of a more appropriate award.6' Stating that
"[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence
dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him
to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose," the
Court found that BMW "did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the
sanction that Alabama might impose" for failing to disclose that Dr. Gore's car had
been repainted prior to sale.62
Significantly, Gore was a fraud case involving purely economic injury. While
Gore has been widely cited by federal courts to reduce punitive damages awards,
"[s]everal state supreme courts have declined to use the ruling to overturn punitive
awards in personal injury cases."'63 The facts of Gore make it easy to distinguish on
other bases as well. The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently upheld a punitive
damages award twenty-three times the compensatory award in a case that, like
reach issue); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (case disposed of on other
grounds); Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 474 U.S. 892, 894-95 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for certiorari) ("Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation
scheme to be a quidpro quo for the common-law or state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, how ade-
quate it must be, thus appears to be an issue unresolved by this Court, and one which is dividing the
appellate and highest courts of several States.").
53. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17.
54. Id. at 18.
55. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
56. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
57. Id. at 1593.
58. Id. at 1593-94.
59. Id. at 1595.
60. Id. at 1598.
61. Id. at 1604.
62. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
63. Mark Thompson, Applying the Brakes to Punitives: But Is There Anything to Slow Down?,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 68, 71.
1998]
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Gore, involved fraud and purely economic injury.' The court distinguished Gore
by pointing out that in contrast to the conduct in Gore, Lister involved intentional
fraudulent conduct. As a result, "the imposition of punitive damages was not
'grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense. ' ' 65
From the plaintiff's perspective, caps may violate state constitutional rights.
Many states, including South Carolina, have "open courts" provisions in their
constitutions' 6 Several state supreme courts have invalidated statutes capping
damages based on an open courts provision or other state constitutional grounds.67
The South Carolina Supreme Court addressed-and rejected-the open courts
argument in Wright v. Colleton County School District.6' The court found that the
open courts provision was "not a guarantee of full compensation to all injured
persons. 69 Moreover, because the legislature provided the statutory remedy, the
legislature could establish its outer limits. 7 However, because Wright concerned the
statutory cap on damages contained in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act7' the
constitutionality of any cap on the common-law remedy of punitive damages
remains open to question.
In the final analysis, the grand constitutional questions that so occupy the courts
probably have little to do with the tort reform movement, driven not by passion for
individual liberty, but by economics. The tort reform movement is fueled by certain
assumptions about the nature, size, and frequency of punitive damages. In a
nutshell, these assumptions are that punitive damages awards are common, unduly
large, and capricious.72
Several recent studies indicate that these beliefs may be patently false. A study
sponsored by the American Bar Foundation analyzed 25,627 civil jury verdicts
64. Lister v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., No. 2754, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 32 at 80, 1997 WL
723056 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1997) (petition for rehearing filed).
65. Id. at 92, 1997 WL 723056 at *10 (quoting Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1599).
66. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("All courts shall be public, and every person shall have
speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained.").
67. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. 1988) (overview of various
state decisions); see also Jill Oliverio, Comment, To Cap or Not to Cap Damage Awards: That is the
Constitutional Question, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 519 (1989) (same).
68. 301 S.C. 282, 391 S.E.2d 564 (1990) (involving the Tort Claims Act's limitation on dam-
ages).
69. Id. at 291, 391 S.E.2d at 570.
70. Id. at 290, 391 S.E.2d at 569.
71. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-78-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
72. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 62 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("The explosion in the frequency and size of punitive damages awards has exposed the constitu-
tional defects that inhere in the common-law system."); Editorial, Trial Lawyers' Triumph, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 1996, at A16 ("[P]unitive damages are wildly unpredictable, so arbitrary as to be un-
fair and are awarded without any guidance to juries, which simply pick numbers out of the air."). See
generally Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1990) (citing four such perceptions: "punitive damages are routinely awarded; they are
awarded in large amounts; the frequency and size of those awards have been rapidly increasing; and
these phenomena are national in scope").
[Vol. 49:293
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between 1981 and 1985 and found that punitive damages were awarded in only
4.9% of cases involving money damages.73 Data collected directly from court
clerks' offices by the Civil Trial CourtNetwork, a project of the National Center for
State Courts and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, indicate that punitive damages
were awarded in only about 3% ofjury trials.74 A mere 4% of that 3%, or 0.12%,
were products liability and medical malpractice cases, the areas that have been the
subject of the greatest calls for reform.75 Other studies have confirmed these results.
A sweeping 1992 study of products liability cases in both state and federal courts
found only 355 punitive damage verdicts in the entire twenty-five-year period
studied.76 More than a quarter of those awards involved a single product:
asbestos.7 A federal study performed by the General Accounting Office and a study
conducted by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice arrived at similar
conclusions.78
Punitive damages in medical malpractice cases are even more rare. Daniels and
Martin found that punitive damages are awarded in a minuscule number of medical
malpractice cases. They report that plaintiffs won only 32.4% of medical
malpractice cases.79 Moreover, of those successful cases, only 2.9%, or 0.94% of
the total cases, resulted in punitive damages."0 The most common areas for punitive
damages awards are intentional torts and business or contract suitssl--certainly not
the areas that most often come up in discussions of the punitive damages "crisis."
Professor Eisenberg and his colleagues analyzed the prior studies and found a
"consistent picture," demonstrating that "[e]xcept in the 'business/contract' cases,
73. Daniels & Martin, supra note 72, at 31. The verdicts were culled from forty-seven counties
in eleven states, chosen for regional balance and availability of data. Id. at 29. The study focused on
the early 1980s because the period is often cited as a time of "crisis" in the tort system. Id. at 28.
74. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability ofPunitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623,
632-33 (1997).
75. Id. at 633.
76. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Punitive Damages in Products Liability: A Research
Report, 3 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 85, 89 (1992) [hereinafter Research Report].
77. Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort An-
ecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 38 (1992). In fact, if asbestos litigation is factored
out, the number of punitive products liability verdicts actuallyfell during the 1980s. Research Report,
supra note 76, at 89.
78. Deborah Hensler & Erik Moller, Trends in Punitive Damages: Preliminary Data from
Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco, California (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Santa Monica,
Cal.), Mar. 1995, at 2 (providing statistics consistent with the other studies discussed); GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, Product Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolution in Five States 2 (Sept. 1989)
[hereinafter Verdicts and Case Resolution] ("GAO found that in general damage awards were not
erratic or excessive.... [Flew punitive damage awards in the cases GAO studied would have
exceeded these caps had they been applicable.").
79. Daniels & Martin, supra note 72, at 38.
80. Id.
81. Hensler & Moller, supra note 78.
1998]
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presumably dominated by fraud and employment law issues, all award rate levels
are likely less than 10 percent, and many are less than 5 percent."82
Whether the size of an award is excessive is, of course, in the eye of the
beholder. In addition, such determinations vary widely based on the nature of the
wrong committed and many other factors such as case category, the defendant's
wealth, and geographic location, to name a few.83 Compiling the results of the
studies discussed above, Eisenberg's group found that "the median punitive damage
award, $50,000, is about the same as the median compensatory award, $49,000.5984
The median punitive damage award in medical malpractice claims between 1963
and 1993 was $228,600, not the multi-million dollar number often assumed." The
study revealed that means were significantly higher than medians, indicating a
system that is mostly stable, but with a few "extraordinarily high awards. ' 6
Contrary to popular opinion, the most recent study indicates that punitive
damages awards are actually strikingly predictable, evidencing strong correlations
to compensatory damages.8 These patterns have not been detected by casual
observers because they only become apparent when awards are stated in terms of
logarithms.88 Professor Eisenberg and his colleagues found that "[t]he only punitive
awards thatwere significantly higherthan the compensatory damages in a case were
those with the lowest awards."89 They concluded that "[t]he hypothesis that punitive
damage awards are randomly plucked out of the air, and bear no relation to
compensatory damages, can be firmly rejected."9
South Carolina appears to be in harmony with the rest of the country. Professor
F. Patrick Hubbard conducted a study of civil jury verdicts in South Carolina
between 1976 and 1985. He found that the nature and frequency of punitive
damages verdicts in South Carolina paralleled that of other states. 91 Professor
82. Eisenberg et al., supra note 74, at 636-37.
83. Id. at 627-31.
84. Id. at 633.
85. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Mal-
practice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters," 47 RtrrsES L. REv. 975, 1008
(1995).
86. Debra Cassens Moss, The Punitive Thunderbolt: How Much Should Courts Curb Extraor-
dinaryAwards?, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 91, 94. (quoting RAND senior researcher Mark Peterson).
Means are averages; medians are the fiftieth percentile. Unlike medians, a mean can be skewed up-
ward by one unusually high award. A stable median therefore "suggests that the typical jury's re-
sponse to the typical case has remained stable." Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System--and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1250 n.376
(1992).
87. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 74, at 637.
88. Id. at 659-60. While the existence of correlations may be comforting to many, focusing on
the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages ignores the purposes of punitive dam-
ages.
89. Thompson, supra note 63, at 69.
90. Eisenberg et al., supra note 74, at 639.
91. F. Patrick Hubbard, "Patterns" in Civil Jury Verdicts in the State Circuit Courts of South
Carolina: 1976-1985, 38 S.C. L. Rv. 699, 742 (1987).
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Hubbard concluded that "punitive awards are not common'" and are particularly
rare in products liability, medical malpractice, and premises liability cases.93
Contrary to common perceptions, he also found that "[t]he overall level of civil
litigation has not undergone extremely large increases in recent years." 94
The studies to date all belie the common misconceptions concerning the state
of the civil justice system and the need for sweeping reforms. The results of so
many different studies are too consistent to be dismissed. However, the rarity of
punitive damages awards and the generally strong correlation to actual damages
does not settle the question of the need for reform. First, as long as damages are
perceived as being out of control,95 this perception may have a "chilling effect" on
the communities that fear punitive damages the most: products manufacturers and
medical care providers. This "overdeterrence" is a valid concern of reformers and
something any meaningful reform measure should address. Moreover, even if
runaway juries are an aberration, due process demands efforts to prevent even the
rare occurrence of an oppressive award.
The difficulty lies in sorting out which reform measures will effectively reirin
the unjustifiably large awards while guaranteeing at least the possibility of adequate
punishment and deterrence of wrongdoing. In the debate over tort reform, one can
easily lose sight of the reasons for punitive damages. Each reform measure should
be analyzed in light of its effects on the paradigm case: an innocent party
grievously harmed by another's reckless or wilful act.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Under our federal system of government, individual states may experiment with
different reforms, allowing other states to see what works and what does not. In the
last several years, forty-five state legislatures have enacted some measure of tort
reform legislation.96 None have been more sweeping than Colorado. Beginning in
1986 and continuing over the following six years, the Colorado legislature enacted
a total of sixty-eight tort reform measures, including abolition ofjoint and several
92. Id. at 743.
93. Id. at 737.
94. Id. at 743-44. Professor Hubbard later conducted a pilot study of a database on civil litiga-
tion. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Designing and Implementing an Expanded System for Civil Court Data
Collection: A South Carolina Study, 47 S.C. L. REv. 537 (1996). The study was conducted in
Richland County, South Carolina, from July 1989 to May 1993 and Berkeley County, South Carolina,
from February 1992 to June 1994. Id. at 550. The number of punitive damages awarded in both coun-
ties totaled approximately 5% of plaintiffs' verdicts, consistent both with each other and with the
larger studies already discussed. Id. at 557. In Richland County, plaintiffs were awarded punitive
damages six times; two punitive awards were assessed inBerkeley County. Id. Professor Hubbard
concluded that "[p]unitive awards are rare and, with occasional exceptions, are relatively modest." Id.
at 558.
95. Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1515 (1997).
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liability, 97 a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages,9 and a cap on punitive
damages equal to the amount of compensatory damages. 9 Results have been
mixed." ° Commercial insurance premiums have decreased, but much less than tort
reformers expected.'"' A reporter for the Wall Street Journal found that the big
winners in the reform game were the insurance carriers:
But, in general, the overall impact on the insurance policyholder has not
been great. The insurers have benefitted more than individual consumers.
Industry losses over the past six years have fallen 30%, while general
commercial liability premiums have dropped only 9% overall, according
to A.M. Best Co., an independent data gatherer.'
Such ambivalent results in themselves would not necessarily counsel against tort
reform. On the positive side, the frivolous lawsuits that fueled the tort reform
movement in Colorado have been discouraged by reducing the possibility of big
payoffs, whether at trial or in a nuisance settlement.' 3
Yet Colorado has also discovered a disconcerting side effect of tort reform: it
is the most severely injured plaintiffs harmed by the most culpable defendants who
find their awards reduced the most.'"" The net result of these reforms has been the
emergence of cases in which plaintiffs horribly injured by a defendant's egregious
misconduct have had awards reduced so much that the plaintiffs' take- home
recovery does not even cover medical bills.' 5 "Because defendants and their
insurers are now insulated from huge damages, costs are transferred to state and
federally funded health programs when victims' insurance limits run out."'0 6 In the
end, taxpayers, rather than the responsible parties, may bear the unexpected burden
of the damages shortfall. While the sweeping reforms enacted in Colorado have
97. COLO. Rv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1997).
98. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1997); see also H.R. 3023, 112 Gen. Assembly, Ist Sess.
(S.C. 1997) (proposing to cap noneconomic damages in South Carolina at $250,000).
99. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1997).
100. See generally Milo Geyelin, Tort Reform Test: Overhaul of Civil Law in Colorado Pro-





104. For example, Roxie Lypps, was horribly burned over 40% of her body in a propane gas
explosion. The gas supplier was found to be in violation of over a dozen safety regulations. Yet, Ms.
Lypps only took home approximately $316,000 of her $1.5 million jury award after legislatively-re-
quired reductions and legal fees. See id.
105. For example, Leah Speaks is a seven year old whose medical bills were already being paid
by Medicaid less than a year after a drunk driver killed her mother and left her in a permanent coma.
Id. Although Colorado holds bars and taverns liable for the actions of drunk patrons, liability is lim-
ited to $150,000 if the bartender acted willfully. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-801(3)(c) (1997).
106. Geyelin, supra note 100.
[Vol. 49:293
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/7
PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAP
benefitted some, their overall impact has been ambiguous at best and terribly unfair
to injured plaintiffs at worst. Such results should caution South Carolina lawmakers
against rushing into reforms that could have incalculable and unintended effects.
Caps have the appeal of simplicity and efficiency in the courtroom. But faimess
to injured plaintiffs should not be sacrificed to expediency. The state, as well as the
plaintiff, has an 'interest in meaningful individualized assessment of appropriate
deter[r]ence and retribution."' 7 Moreover, even if the empirical data is wrong and
jury verdicts are capricious and unpredictable as reformers assert,0 8 it is certainly
no improvement to replace jury discretion with an even more arbitrary system that
caps damages uniformly without considering all the relevant facts of a particular
case. The $250,000 proposed figure bears no relationship to the degree of a
defendant's misconduct, or to anything else for that matter!0 9
An alternative to caps is a multiplier by which punitive damages are tied to a
multiple of actual damages. The bill pending in the South Carolina General
Assembly uses amultiplier of three times actual damages."' However, this solution
is also flawed. A multiplier based on compensatory damages ties punishment solely
to the harm caused, not to the degree of the defendant's guilt. In cases where the
defendant's conduct was egregious but actual damages were fortuitously very small,
a multiplier completely fails its purpose."' Currently, South Carolina law
recognizes this failure and courts examine punitive damage awards in light of "the
severity of the offense.""' 2
107. Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 111, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1991) (quoting Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991)) (emphasis added).
108. See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
109. See generally Edward Felsenthal, Why a MedicalAward Cap Remains Stuck at $250,000,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995, at BI (describing history of $250,000 cap). The $250,000 figure seems
to have first appeared in 1975 in California in the context of a limit on pain-and-suffering awards in
medical malpractice cases. Id. At the time, most pain-and-suffering awards were under $250,000. The
idea was to eliminate wild card damage awards while leaving most jury awards undisturbed. Due to
inflation, $250,000 in 1975 is worth only about a third of that today. Id. Yet the figure has endured as
the "magic number" for damages caps, despite its arbitrary origins. Barry Keene, the former Califor-
nia assemblyman who authored the original bill, admitted, "'[The $250,000 figure] wasn't the prod-
uct of much scientific appraisal."' Id. Critics point out the inequity of the figure by comparing it to
holding doctors' salaries at 1975 levels. Id.
110. H.R. 3023, 112 Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997). The bill provides that "[p]unitive
damages awarded against a defendant shall not exceed three times the amount of compensatory dam-
ages or two hundred fifty thousand dollars, whichever is greater." Id.
111. This is why South Carolina law allows an award of punitive damages to be supported by
nominal damages. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
112. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 112, 406 S.E.2d at 354. Compare this to the United States Supreme
Court's "guidepost" of the ratio of punitive damages to actual or potential harm. See BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1601-02 (1996); see also Ellis, supra note 40, at 77 ("The princi-
ple that punitive damages should bear some relationship to the harm actually caused cannot be recon-
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Caps and multipliers not only make adequate punishment less likely, they also
prevent punitive damages from working as a deterrent. If defendants know ahead
of time what their maximum liability will be, they may well make a cost-benefit
decision to move ahead with the wrongful conduct."' Some degree of uncertainty
is necessary for the deterrent effect of punitive damages to work.'1 4 In tension with
this need for uncertainty is the United States Supreme Court's holding in BMW of
NorthAmerica, Inc. v. Gore"' that due process requires fair notice of the magnitude
of the punishment to which a defendant could be subject. "6 However, the Court did
not hold that the common-law system for assessing punitive damagesperse violated
due process-only that BMW in that case did not receive adequate notice.",7
In fact, punitive awards very seldom exceed the proposed caps." 8 Depending
on one's perspective, this can mean either caps are not necessary because they are
rarely exceeded anyway, or caps should be enacted because they will bring stability
to the system by eradicating the very high verdicts while leaving the majority of
verdicts intact. The first argument ignores the rare wildcard verdict, while the
second argument ignores the cases in which a higher verdict is richly deserved.
The primary problem with caps and multipliers is that, particularly in the case
of products liability, punitive damages are the best method that society has to force
social responsibility on business. Businesses exist to make profit. Corporate
managers "are morally responsible for promoting the private economic interests of
the stockholders."".9 In a famous interview, Milton Friedman explained why he
would not buy stock in a company that worked to eliminate pollution out of a sense
of social responsibility:
113. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 42, at 199; see also Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive
Damages: TowardaPrincipled.Approach, 31 HASTINGSL.J. 639, 666 (1980) ("The deterrent effect
of punitive damages would be minimized if a person contemplating wrongful conduct could gauge his
or her maximum liability in advance.").
114. Under the vindication theory of punitive damages, unlike the punishment and deterrence
theories, the plaintiff is compensated for the defendant's violation of the plaintiff's personal freedom.
To the degree that punitive damages are awarded as vindication, rather than as punishment or deter-
rence, caps may be perfectly appropriate. Paradoxically, South Carolina's proposed bill eliminates
vindication as a basis for awarding punitive damages. H.R. 3019, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess.
(S.C. 1997).
115. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
116. Id. at 1598.
117. Id. On the contrary, the Court has previously stated the opposite: "[W]e cannot say that
the common-law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process
and beper se unconstitutional." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991).
118. Thompson, supra note 63, at 72; see also Verdicts and Case Resolution, supra note 78, at
3 ("[Flew punitive damage awards in the cases GAO studied would have exceeded these caps had
they been applicable.").
119. Richard A. Rodewald, The Corporate Social Responsibility Debate: Unanswered Ques-
tions About the Consequences of Moral Reform, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 443, 446 (1987).
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A corporate executive's responsibility is to make as much money for the
stockholders as possible, as long as he operates within the rules of the
game. When an executive decides to take action for reasons of social
responsibility, he is taking money from someone else-from the
stockholders, in the form of lower dividends; from the employees, in the
form of lower wages; or from the consumer, in the form of higher prices. 20
The "bottom line" is that many corporations see their primary duty as
maximization of profits. Therefore, corporations decide to make safer products in
only two circumstances: when it is profitable to do so, as in the case of luxury
items,' 2' or when it is or might be very unprofitable not to do so, because of the high
risk of liability suits."
Punitive damages in products cases should promote unprofitability when a
corporation knowingly or recklessly markets unsafe products. The argument that
punitive damages impair the competitiveness of American companies misses the
point. First, businesses-like individuals-should act appropriately whether or not it
is profitable. American companies are also disadvantaged by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act that prohibits bribing overseas officials," but that does not mean we
should sanction bribery. Second, the remedy of punitive damages "keeps the ethical
corporation from being at a competitive disadvantage."' 24 Professor Robert J.
Rafalko addresses the problem of corporate ethics and argues that the system of
punishment for corporations must be such that "[a] manager or high-level
executive... feel[s] free to steer his company in ethical and socially responsible
directions without fear of being held accountable for diminished profit margins as
a result."'25 Capping punitive damages would make it difficult, if not impossible,
for companies that go the extra mile for safety to compete with those that do not.
If punitive damages are capped, corporate managers will simply factor the cost
of liability into the cost of doingbusiness and then decide whether it would be more
profitable to make the product safer or pay the (now conveniently calculable)
potential judgments. Several high-profile products liability cases have involved
"smoking gun" documents, proving that corporate executives knew of the products'
120. Playboy Interview: Milton Friedman, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1973, at 59, reprinted in ROBERT
HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPoRATIoNs 589 (5th ed. 1994).
121. For example, Mercedes Benz Motor Company has long had a reputation for marketing au-
tomobiles with extra safety features-and for doing so profitably. But Mercedes are not economy
cars, so this does not solve the problem for the average consumer.
122. Roughly 29,000 product-related deaths and 33 million injuries occur each year. Thomas
Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: An Empirical Study of the Impact of
State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 16 JUST. Sys. J. 21, 40 1993) [herein-
after Quiet Revolution].
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994).
124. Research Report, supra note 76, at 94.
125. Robert J. Rafalko, Remaking the Corporation: The 1991 US. Sentencing Guidelines, 13
J. Bus. ETHics 625, 634 (1994).
1998]
15
Hawkins: Balancing Act: Public Policy and Punitive Damages Caps
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
dangers yet made a bottom-line decision not to recall the product. For example, in
the famous Ford Pinto case, internal documents showed that Ford officials knew the
Pinto prototype failed the fuel system integrity crash test, yet they made a
financially motivated decision to release the car to the public unchanged.1 6 Punitive
damages are consumers' best safeguard against this type of unrestricted capitalism.
Furthermore, punitive damages are particularly necessary to protect the "little
guy." Many products liability cases involve cheap products, such as the textbook
case involving children's nightclothes made from highly flammable "flannelette."'
27
Consumers of luxury goods do not always need the same protection. As the
Mercedes example illustrates, upper-income consumers can demand and pay for
greater safety. Punitive damages put power in the hands of consumers offlannelette
nightgowns and Ford Pintos to ensure that their products are safe, too.
28
In an article published in this volume, three business law professors advocate
the use of court-supervised "compliance programs" as an alternative to punitive
damages. 129 Their sample plan includes: ongoing monitoring of industry
developments; steps to ensure adequate product labeling and instructions;
solicitation of feedback from customers, lower-level employees, and others in the
industry; firm-wide assignment of responsibility for compliance with government
regulations; and adequate training of service personnel.' 30 But such compliance
programs are not punishment. In fact, these programs should be routine. If
corporations would institute-and enforce-such programs as prevention, they
would eliminate much of their exposure to punitive damages. As punishment,
compliance programs suffer from the same fatal flaw as caps on punitive damages:
they provide no incentive for corrective action before the fact. If the worst
punishment meted out against a corporation is to make it perform as it should have
originally, then it will always be more profitable to continue business as usual.
When it comes to medical malpractice, the equities shift. Of course, health care
providers are interested in making money, but their primary moral and ethicial
obligation is to care for their patients. Doctors should not be exposed to punitive
damages unless they recklessly disregard this duty and act with complete
126. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981); see also J. Stratton
Shartel, Defense Timelines Plays Key Role in TrialAgainst GM, 10 INSIDE LITIG. 1 (1996) (describ-
ing plaintiff's use of defendant's internal documents to make the case against the car manufacturer).
In a recent case in Alabama, the jury awarded $150 million to a man who was paralyzed when the
latch on his Chevrolet Blazer failed during a crash. Internal documents revealed that General Motors
was aware of the problem and in fact had estimated that there would be "18,000 door openings each
year in crashes involving GM vehicles equipped with Type III door latches." Shartel, supra, at 2.
127. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980).
128. For an interesting discussion of how caps on damages disproportionately impact already
disadvantaged groups, see Troy L. Cady, Note, Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: The Discrimina-
tory Effects of Punitive Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1005 (1997).
129. Charles M. Foster, Jr. et al., Compliance Programs: An Alternative to Punitive Damages
for Corporate Defendants, 49 S.C. L. REv. 247 (1998).
130. Id. at 267-68.
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indifference to their patients' health. This is the law in South Carolina. "[A] mere
mistake in diagnosis or error in judgment alone is insufficient to support a finding
of malpractice,' 3. much less an award of punitive damages.
When personal injury is not involved, different factors come into play.
Although the vast majority of punitive damages are assessed in business and
contract actions, 132 that is not the thrust of the current South Carolina bill. While the
bill is not specifically limited to tort actions, tort reform was clearly the motivation
behind this and most other bills capping punitive damages.'
V. CONCLUSION
The arguments in this article have addressed why uncapped punitive damages
are necessary in appropriate cases. It is the inappropriate case, however, that
troubles people so much. People are disturbed to learn that the child thrown from
a Chrysler minivan may not have been wearing a seatbelt, but the Charleston jury
that awarded $262 million to his parents was not provided with that information.'
People are angered when a rich doctor buys himself a "fancy BMW," and then wins
a $4 million verdict because the company failed to inform him that the car was
repainted prior to sale.'35
However, caps are not the solution. If punitive damages are to serve any
purpose at all, they must not be legislatively capped at arbitrary levels. Such a
drastic reform would eviscerate the remedy, punishing innocent consumers rather
than reckless tortfeasors. Instead, the solution is clear guidelines for juries, coupled
with rigorous post-trial review-already in effect in South Carolina.'36 The
effectiveness of such steps has already been demonstrated. In the year since Gore,
"[c]ourts have invoked the ruling at least 20 times to slash multimillion-dollar
punitive awards."'37 Thus, uncapped liability does not mean limitless liability.
Although post-trial review may be less efficient than caps at striking down runaway
punitive awards, it ensures fairness to both parties by protecting the defendant's due
131. McCourt v. Abernathy, 318 S.C. 301, 308, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1995).
132. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
133. See Al Dozier, Personal InjuryAwards Could Hit Limit, THEHERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.),
Feb. 12, 1996, at A4. Representative Herbert Kirsh, the bill's sponsor, is quoted: 'Everybody you
talk to about the McDonald's (hot coffee) case says it's ridiculous .... People have to take some re-
sponsibility for themselves. Ijust believe something needs to be done."' Id.
134. Plaintiffs claim that the child was properly secured upon entering the vehicle, but he un-
buckled his own seatbelt just as the family drove through the intersection where the fatal crash oc-
curred. Letter from Mark C. Joye, attorney for plaintiffs (Dec. 18, 1997) (on file with author). In any
case, Judge Falcon Hawkins ruled the evidence of whether the child was wearing a seatbelt was
inadmissable because the child fell under one of the exceptions to South Carolina's mandatory
seatbelt law, S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6530 (Law. Co-op. 199). Order dated Sept. 9, 1997 on motions
in limine, Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., No. 2:96-2296-11 at 6.
135. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
136. See Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104,406 S.E.2d 350 (1991).
137. Thompson, supra note 63, at 71.
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process rights without slamming the courtroom door on plaintiffs who have been
the victims of egregious misconduct.
The South Carolina General Assembly would be rash to replace post-trial
review with sweeping reforms, the full impact of which cannot be calculated.
Statistics show that while tort reform may greatly impact the amount of initial
awards, the effect on the amounts actually collected is much smaller, suggesting that
trial judges are already performing this function on a case-by-case basis.'38
Ultimately, the General Assembly should not make policy decisions based on media
reports of a few high-profile cases, not even if one of those cases was decided in
South Carolina.
Andrea Moore Hawkins
138. Quiet Revolution, supra note 122, at 36. Thus, it is too early to pass judgment on the
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